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Abstract:  This  paper  investigates  the  linkages  between  farmers’  machinery 
investment decision and off-farm employment in China. Both the theoretical model 
and the empirical results based on a survey of 453 households in Anhui Province 
indicate that agricultural labor input and small-size machinery investment are gross 
complements  rather  than  substitutes  when  machinery  service  is  available  in  the 
market. Consequently, farmers with small machinery are more likely to reduce their 
off-time employment time.   
 
JEL : Q12 




Machinery Investment Decision and Off-Farm Employment in 
Rural China 
1. Introduction 
  Even though off-farm employment plays a critical role in many developing and 
transition economies on the one hand, and the studies find that 20-70 percent of the 
household income is from off-farm resources (Adams 2001; Benjamin 1992), the role 
of capital investment is critical for rural development and economic transition on the 
other  hand.  Some  studies  claim  that  capital  constraint  is  a  major  determinant  of   
adoption rate of new technologies (Mundlak 1993, 2000), and others believe capital 
accumulation is    essential for development of rural communities ( de Brauw 2003; 
Stark 1991; Liu & Wang 2005). 
Furthermore,  the  current  literature  has  pointed  out  that  the  linkages  between 
off-farm  labor  markets  and  farms’  capital  investment  has  important  policy 
implications.  Labor  market  policy  tends  to  spill  over  to  farm  sector  via  farmers’ 
decision of labor and capital inputs, while agricultural policy affects both rural and 
urban labor markets (Ahituv and Kimhi 2002; Rosenzweig 1980). Ahituv and Kimhi 
(2002) find that off-farm labor supply and farm capital are negatively correlated in 
Israel and indicate that farmers’ capital investments enhanced by heavily subsidized 
credit  prevent  them  from  seeking  off-farm  employment  opportunities.    Similarly, 
Lagerkvist et al (2007) find that farmers’ capital accumulation has a negative impact 
on off-farm income share in Southwestern Minnesota. 
The  current  literature  mainly  sheds  light  on  the  effect  of  off-farm  work  on 
farmer’s  capital  (farm or nonfarm) accumulation decision (De Brauw et al. 2002;De 
Brauw and Rozelle 2008; Sh, Heerin, Qu, 2007). It is important to note that the capital 
markets are less complete in developing economies and off-farm income can finance 
capital  accumulation  when  the  agriculture  household  is  subject  to  borrowing 
constraints (Reardon 1997; de Brauw et al. 2002).     
A less concerned but perhaps more important issue is the impact of off-farm work 
on  the  demand  of  farm  capital.  Some  studies  suggest  that  labor  and  capital  are 3 
 
complements in farm production, so that off-farm work opportunities (or the wage 
level) would reduce farm capital demand. Foltz and Aldana (2006) find that wages 
driven by local economic conditions indeed reduce investment in cows for Wisconsin 
dairy farmers. However, other researchers presume farm labor and farm capital are 
substitutes,  then  the  relationship  becomes  complicated:  the  substitution  effect  of 
inputs  in  farm  production  results  in  a  positive  correlation  between  off-farm 
employment and capital accumulation, while the expansion effect which denotes that 
a decrease in  agricultural  output due to  less labor input leads  to  less demand for 
capital  could  cause  a negative  correlation.  Kada (1991)  finds that the  substitution 
effect  plays  a  major  role  for  Japanese  rice  farms  as  farm  labor  and  capital  are 
negatively associated. Interestingly, even though Ahituv and Kimhi (2002) and Liu et 
al (2002) similarly find that off-farm employment and farm capital  are negatively 
correlated, they explain it the expansion effect. 
In farm production, certain types of capital (e.g. dairy cows) are complements to 
labor, while others (e.g. tractor) are substitutes for labor. Therefore, we should pay 
attention  to  the  differences  in  the  relationship  between  capitals  and  off-farm 
employment for different types of capital in the analysis. 
This study will specifically shed light on the relationship between machinery and 
off-famer employment. There are three reasons: First, machinery investment is the 
largest part of farm investment in Chinese crop production and it is important for 
technical  progress  in  agricultural  production  (Liu  and  Wang,  2005);  Second, 
machinery and labor are obvious substitutes in farm production, and the relationship 
between  off-farm  employment  and  machinery  investment  is  hence  ambiguous  as 
aforementioned  and  thus  it  needs  an  empirical  analysis  for  clarification;  Third, 
Chinese government started to subsidize agricultural machinery from 2004 and the 
subsidy has increased to 13.0 billion yuan in 2009, so that this study focusing on 
farmers’ joint decision of off-farm work and machinery investment can help assess the 
impact of machinery-subsidy policies on labor market . 
Even though a few studies have studied the impact of off-farm employment on 4 
 
machinery investment, the other side of the picture---the feedback of machinery on 
off-farm employment, has not been well studied. Obviously, the decisions of off-farm 
employment and machinery investment are possibly simultaneously made and they 
are endogenous. For instance, Zhao (2002) divided labors into non-migrants, migrants 
and returnees, and she finds that in rural China the numbers of  non-migrants and 
returnees  increase  farm  machinery  investment  significantly  while  the  number  of 
migrants has no significant influence. Even though the result implies that off-farm 
employment could reduce farm machinery investment, her model did not control other 
important variables and the endogenous problem is not tackled.   
A  common  shortcoming  of  agricultural  household  investment  models  in  the 
current literature is that the capital service market is neglected and the investment 
behavior is looked as the same as production input behavior.    However, we cannot 
deny  the  fact  that  the  capital  service  market  does  exist  especially  for  agriculture 
machinery. The fact in China is that most rural households buy some or all of the 
machinery service from market, similar in other countries where the scale of farm is 
small.   
  When  the  market  service  is  available,  the  relationship  between  off-farm 
employment and machinery investment becomes even more complicated. On the one 
hand, off-farm employment influences machinery investment through three channels. 
First,  off-farm  employment  influences  machinery  service  demand  in  agricultural 
production. Usually, more services used in production, more likely the agriculture 
household  invests  in  small  self-used  machinery.  Second,  off-farm  employment 
opportunity increases the opportunity labor  costs of machinery-operating work for 
farmers, which makes households more likely to purchase the market services. Third, 
off-farm  income  relaxes  the  budget  constraints  and  helps  the  household  purchase 
machinery.  On  the  other  hand,  the  machinery  also  impact  off-farm  employment 
decisions. When an agriculture household maintains agricultural machinery, it implies 
that her/his shadow cost of machinery service should be lower than the market price, 
which  would  influence  both  farm  and  off-farm  labor  supply.  In  addition,  the 5 
 
tractor-operating work would also reduce off-farm labor supply. 
The primary goal of our paper is to examine the simultaneous decision of off-farm 
employment  and  t  agricultural  machinery  investments  when  there  is  a  machinery 
service market for agriculture households in China. To meet this goal, we have three 
specific  objectives.  First,  we  introduce  the  development  of  agricultural  machinery 
service  market  in  China  and  farmers’  choice  between  purchasing  machinery  and 
purchasing  the  market  services.  Second,  we  develop  a  theoretical  model  that 
illustrates  farmers’  the  endogenous  linkages  between  off-farm  employment  and 
machinery investment. Third, we empirically test the above-mentioned relationship 
using a structural econometric model to identify the endogeneity issues. The data for 
our study are collected from a face-to-face farmer survey in Anhui Province of China. 
2. Investment in Small machinery or Purchasing Market Services 
(1) The development of agricultural machinery service market in China 
Prior  to  1980,  China  adopted  a  central-planned  economy  system,  and  the 
investment decision of agricultural machinery was controlled by the governments. 
Specifically, the agricultural machinery stations owned by the state or the collectives 
monopolistically provided machinery services for agriculture production at planned 
price. A large production collective were more likely to have large-size machinery. In 
fact, it was the incorrect perception that large-size machinery cannot be divided and 
there  was  a  scale  economy  in  agriculture  production  induced  the  adoption  of  the 
collective  economy,  name  people’s  commune  in  China.  For  instance,  agricultural 
mechanization had been used as one of the rationales for the collective campaign in 
the  1950s  (Lin,  1990).  Until  the  end  of  1978,  the  capacity  of  large-  and 
medium-sized
1  agricultural tractors was 17.55 million kilowatts,  which is about 1.5 
times of the capacity of small tractors.   
After 1978, the collectively-owned land was allocated to rural households and 
farmers still could obtain machinery services the agricultural machinery stations at 
first.  Later,  the  agricultural  machinery  stations  also  introduced  the  sub -contract 
                                                        
1  In Chinese statics, large- and medium-size tractors refer to a tractor with capacity more 
than 14.7 kilowatts. The small tractors are the ones with capacity between 2.2 and 14.7 kilowatts.   6 
 
system in order to improve the economic efficiency, and the machinery were allocated 
to those selected farmers who provided services at the contracted fees (Feder et al 
1992). With increase in accumulation, farmers started to purchase a large number of 
small and general machinery for own-use or joint-use. The machinery service market 
characterized by large-  and medium-size machinery  began to  be stagnant  or even 
shrink.  From  1978  to  1988,  the  capacity  of  large-  and  medium-sized  agricultural 
tractors increased by 65%, while the small tractors increased by 354%. Furthermore, 
from 1988 to 1995, large- and medium-sized agricultural tractors even shrunk by 17%, 
while the small tractors grew by 47.5%.   
However, after the middle of 1990s, the development of agricultural machinery in 
China turned back to an era of specialization and being market-oriented. In this period, 
the markets of machinery service in the whole nation began to be integrating. For 
instance, the market services of plowing, sowing and rice harvesting are no longer 
confined in a province. Hence, the large- and medium-size agricultural tractors began 
to grow again, and its growth rate has been higher than small tractors since 1999. 
Then the subsidy policies for large- and medium-size agricultural machinery launched 
in 2004 further stimulate the purchase of large- and medium-sized tractors. 
Even though there are some regional differences in the agricultural machinery 
service  markets  in  China,  the  status  quo  of  the  owner  structure  of  agricultural 
machinery are very divergent, which is quite similar within most provinces. Some 
farmers  own  small  agricultural  machinery  (or  draft  animals)  for  the  purpose  of 
own-use, while others do not retain any machinery at all and they purchase machinery 
services from markets provided by owners of large- and medium-size machinery.
2 
(2) Data Description    
  The data used in this paper were collected from Anhui Province of China in June 
and July 2009 by face-to-face interviews. Anhui is one of the largest producers of 
grain crops and one of the largest off-farm labor suppliers in China, which makes this 
                                                        
2  In 2009 per hundred Chinese rural households owe 3.37large- and medium-sized tractors, 
19.39 small tractors and 25.39 draught animals. And per hundred Anhui rural households owe 4.85 
large and medium-sized tractors, 39.73 small tractors and 5.61 draught animals (China national 
statistical bureau, 2009). 7 
 
study  very  representative  for  the  relationship  between  off-farm  employment  and 
agricultural machinery investment. The sample includes 453 agriculture households 
randomly selected from 24 villages in 8 towns scattered in 4 counties. Two of the 
counties (Mengcheng County and Lixin County) are in Huaibei Plain where there are 
two  cropping  seasons  in  a  year,  namely  wheat  in  spring  and  soybean  or  corn  in 
autumn. Other two counties (Changfeng county and Feixi county) are located in the 
Jianghuai  mountainous  region with  plenty of precipitation  where there  are two or 
three cropping seasons per year, and the main crops include    rice, wheat, rapeseed, 
and  cotton.  The  survey  collected  detailed  information  on  households’  off-farm 
activities, agricultural production, possession and use of machinery in the past year 
(namely, from July 2008 to June 2009). 
Almost every household in the sample uses certain kinds of machinery services in 
their  farm  production,  such  as  plowing,  sowing,  non-till  planting,  harvesting, 
threshing, and spraying of pesticides. In the 453 surveyed households, 191 do not 
have any agricultural machinery, accounting for 42.2%; 247 have certain kinds of 
agricultural machinery for own-use most of which are small tractors for towing and 
plowing, seeders and transport equipments. Households who do not have these kinds 
of machinery can purchase the services from market. While other kinds of machinery 
service  such  as  harvesting,  ditching,  non-till  planting,  corn  threshing  are  mainly 
provided by markets, because these services generally require large- and medium-size 
machinery, and the households with small tractors generally do not purchase these 
equipments. Totally, there are 15 households in the sample who provide machinery 
services for others, accounting for 3.3%.   
Our survey also shows agricultural households in Anhui province are extensively 
involved  in  off-farm  activities.  Average  off-employment  time  per  laborer  is  5.44 
months. Comparing to the households without agricultural machinery, more laborers 
are  found  in  the  households  with  agricultural  machinery,  and  they  conduct  less 
off-farm employment. It indicates a positive correlation between farm machinery and 
farm laboring, or equivalently a negative correlation between farm machinery and 8 
 
off-farm laboring. 
3. Theoretical model 
Theoretically,  agriculture  households  have  three  options  to  obtain  machinery 
services: purchasing the machinery, renting the machinery or buying the machinery 
service. However, the second option is very rare, so that it can be neglected.    We also 
ignore some of the agriculture households who purchase the large- and medium-size 
machinery  to  do  business.  We  will  only  focus  on  agriculture  households’  choice 
between purchasing machinery for own-use and purchasing the market services. 
Assume there is only one particular type of small-size machinery for own-use, and 
its  price  is q .  It  will  generate  K   units  of  service  if  fully  used.  Most  Chinese 
agriculture  households  only  cultivate  a  very  small  piece  of  land  and  a  small-size 
machinery can satisfy their needs, so that we presume agriculture households only 
need to buy one machine. Further assume the interest rate isr , the nature depreciation 
rate is , and the fixed cost of maintaining the machinery is () qr   . If a farmer does 
not  retain  machinery,  s/he  can  buy  machinery  services  from  the  market  by  the 
price k p .   
When a farmer does not retain machinery, we assume that s/he maximizes its total 
income by purchasing machinery service and allocating a fixed labor endowment (L) 
between farm and off-farm activities. Farm production function is as follow: 
( , , ) y f l k n   
where  l,  k ,  and  n   are  farm  labor  input,  machinery  service  input,  and  land 
endowment. The objective function of the household is thus written as: 
00 ( 0, 0) max ( , , ) ( ) k lk I I pf l k n p k w L l
                          (1) 
where  p   is  the  price  vector  of  agricultural  products,  k p   is  the  price  of 
machinery  service,  w   is  the  wage  rate  of  off-farm  activities,  and  Ll    is  the 
off-farm work time. 
Objective function (1) equals: 9 
 
0 I wL                                                                                                       (2) 
where  ( , , ) k pf l k n wl p k       isr farm profit, and  wL  stands for the value of 
labor endowment. 
So the income maximization problem is transformed into a profit maximization 
problem.  Assume  that  production  function  is  well-behaved  (the  first  derivative  is 
positive, and the second derivative is negative) and there are interior solutions. The 
first order conditions are:   
l pf w  , and  kk pf p  . 
And    the solutions for  l  and  k   are: 
*
0 ( , , , ) k l l p p w n         (Farm labor demand function)                       (3) 
*
0 ( , , , ) k k k p p w n        (Machinery service demand function)            (4) 
As we know, labor inputs and machinery service are normally gross substitute in 
production. So for equation (4) we can reasonably assume that ( , , , )/ 0 k k p p w n w     
The off-farm labor supply will be: 
**
00 n l L l  
And we can obtain the maximum profit and income: 
*
0 ( , , , ) k p p w n   , and 
**
00 I wL                               (5) 
When  an  agriculture  household  retains  agricultural  machinery  and  produce 
machinery  service  for  herself/himself,  we  assume  that  s/he  maximizes  the  total 
income by allocating the labor endowment among farm work, machinery-operating 
work  and  off-farm  work.  For  the  sake  of  simplicity,  we  further  assume  that  the 
machinery service production function has the Leontief form: to provide 1 unit of 
machinery  service  needs  1/a units  of  operating-labor  ( o l )  and  c units  of  other 
variable inputs represented by  v,    such as fuel and lubricants to run the machinery. 
That is, 
/ o l k a  ;v ck   10 
 
The objective function of the household is thus rewritten as: 
1 1 0
( 0, 0)
max ( , , ) ( ) ( )
( , , ) ( / ) ( )






I I pf l k n p v w L l l q r
pf l k n p ck w L l k a q r







      
      
      
   
      (6) 
where  v p   is the price vector of variable inputs in machinery service production, 
( , , ) ( / ) v pf l k n p c w a k wl        is the farm profit. 
We can solve equation (6) by the same way in equation (2) and obtain following 
results, 
*
1 ( , / , , ) v l l p p c w a w n  ； 
*
1 ( , / , , ) v k k p p c w a w n  ；  
* * *
1 1 1 / n l L l k a     
*
1 ( , / , , ) v p p p p c w a w n  ； 
**
11 () I wL q r       
If  retaining  machinery  results  in  higher  total  income,  that  is
**
10 0 II  ,  the 
agriculture household would buy the machinery, and vice verse. 
**
10 ( , / , , ) ( , , , ) ( ) vk I I p p c w a w n p p w n q r                           (7) 
The first-order Taylor expansion approximation shows: 
( , , , )
( , / , , ) ( , , , ) ( / )
k
v k k v
k
p p w n





    

      (8) 









, thus equation (8) can be written as: 
( , / , , ) ( , , , ) ( , , , )( / ) v k k v k p p c w a w n p p w n k p p w n p c w a p                      (9) 
Substituting equation (9) into equation (7), we obtain: 
**
10( , , , )*( / ) ( ) k k v I I k p p w n p p c w a q r                              (10) 
So that
**








p p c w a
k p p w n
 









p c w a
k p p w n
 
   is  the  opportunity  costs  of  own-provided 11 
 




( , , , ) k
qr
k p p w n
 
. 
In equation (11), the farm machinery investment decisions can be approximately 
stated as: when the average costs of own-service is lower than the market price the 
household will invest machinery, and vice verse. 
Let's  focus  on  the  effect  of  off-farm  employment  wage  on  farm  machinery 
investment.  First,  as  the  off-farm  employment  wage  increases  the  labor  costs  of 
machinery-operating  will  increase  too,  but  the  average  maintaining  costs 
*
()
( , , , ) k
qr
k p p w n
 
  will  decrease  because  of  the  gross  substitute  effect 
( , , , )/ 0 k k p p w n w    .  The  overall  effect  depends  on  the  gross  substitute  effect 
between  labor  and  machinery  service,  and  we  will  specifically  examine  it  in  the 
following empirical analysis for China. Second, if the agriculture household is subject 
to  borrowing  constraints, the off-farm income  can finance machinery by  lowering 
financial costs, so do the maintaining costs. 
Finally, the impact of retaining machinery on off-farm employment time can be 
given as, 
* * * * *
1 0 0 1 1 / ( , , , ) ( , / , , )
( , / , , )/
n n n k v
v
l l l l l k a l p p w n l p p c w a w n
k p p c w a w n a
        

      (12)   
The  mechanisms  between  purchasing  own-use  machinery  and  purchasing 
machinery services from the market are totally different. The decision depends on the 
costs structures: the former includes machinery running and operation costs, and the 
later is determined by market prices. Nevertheless, the input substitution effect would 
increase and the expansion effect would decrease the labor input in farm production. 
Moreover, the machinery operating work will reduce the off-farm labor supply. 
In the following part we will test the specific relationship between them using 
the survey data from China. 
 12 
 
4. Empirical methods 
4.1 Empirical models 
The  theoretical  model  shows  that  time  allocation  between  farm  activity  and 
off-farm employment and machinery investments are interrelated, and the sign of the 
relation is ambiguous. We use the following simultaneous equations to estimate the 
linkages between off-farm employment and farm machinery investment: 
1 1 2 1
2 2 1 2
(off-farm employment equation)














where 1i y ,  and  2i y respectively  denote  off-farm  employment  time  and the  possession  of     
machinery  (1=possession  of  machinery  ,  0=otherwise).  1i x and  2i x   are  vectors  of 
exogenous  variables.  1i    and  2i    are  random  disturbances,  following  normal 
distributions with means of zero.   
Because  not  every  agriculture  household  is  involved  in  off-farm  activity,  a 
censoring issue underlies the empirical model, so that a tobit model with endogenous 
variables  is  recommended    in  the  off-farm  work  equation.  While  for  the  farm 
machinery investment equation, a probit model with endogenous variables is applied. 
As there are endogenous variables in those two models, we analyze the data using 
instrumental variables (IV) approaches.   
4.2 Variables   
According to the theoretical model, the explanatory variables in the equations are 
land endowments, labor endowments and the prices. For the cross-sectional data, the 
prices are usually constants, and therefore can not be put into the empirical models. 
The off-farm unemployment wage or opportunity cost is not constant for different 
agriculture households, and is assumed to be determined by human capital and local 
economic conditions. The price of machinery services in different villages is also not 
identical. Take the wheat/rice combine harvesting as an example, the lowest price is 
40 yuan/mu and the highest price is 80 yuan/mu. This can be looked as “the price of 
pure machinery service (eg, measured by machinery running time) which however is 13 
 
the equal within the village because of the competition among providers, even though   
the costs of the services might be different due to the heterogeneities of topography, 
soil  conditions,  field  roads  conditions,  the  concentration  of  agriculture,  and  the 
fragmentation of land. The difference in  market  service price in  different  villages 
mainly reflects the utilization efficiency of large- and medium-sized machinery. The 
utilization efficiency of the more flexible small-size machinery is less affected by 
those conditions. Therefore the higher the market price is the more likely a household 
retains small machinery. 
Based on the above analysis, the independent variables used in the off-farm work 
time  (ofwt)  model  mainly  include  farm  machinery,  land  endowment,  labor  force, 
average age of labor force, average schooling of labor force, and the local off-farm 
employment  opportunities  (represented  by  off-farm  employment  time,  male  wage, 
and female labors in other families of the village and local non-farm work time, male 
wage of male, and female labors in other families of the village). Particularly, the 
variables  of  employment  opportunities  can  be  looked  as  instrumental  variables  in 
machinery investment. 
  The  independent  variables  used  in  farm  machinery  investment  (fm)  model 
include  off-farm  work  time,  labor  force,  land  endowment,  and  market  price  of 
machinery  service.  The  farm  machinery  is  mainly  driven  by  household  head  and 
young male labors, so the characteristics of household head and the share of young 
male laborers are also included in the investment model which can be looked as the 
instruments in off-farm employment. The wealth of household both can help laborers 
to conduct non-farm business and can facilitate household to buy farm machinery, so 
that we will put this variable into both two equations. In light of this, both of the 
behavior equations can be identified in econometric analysis. 
5. Results and discussion 
5.1 Off-farm work equation 
Following Smith and Blundell (1986) and Wooldridge (2002, pp531) we estimate 
the off-farm work time model using the maximum likelihood (Tobit model) and IV 14 
 
approaches. The results are reported in Table 3. The instrumental variables are the 
exogenous  variables  in  Table  2.  And  a  Wald  test  rejects  the  assumption  that 
agricultural machinery is exogenous at the 10% level. 
The variable of special interest in this equation is the farm machinery.    The 
estimated coefficient for it is -12.94 and statistically significant at 1%. This suggests 
that  an  agriculture  household  that  retains  farm  machinery  is  less  involved  in  the 
off-farm activities. This is an interesting result. The common wise tells us the farm 
machinery  can  substitute  labor  input  in  farm  production  and  therefore  increase 
non-farm  labor  supply.  But  this  is  not  always  true  especially  when  the  market 
machinery  service  is  available.  As  labor  and  machinery  are  complements  in 
machinery  service  production,  the  agriculture  household  producing  the  machinery 
service for herself or himself supplies less off-farm labor. 
As can be seen from Table 3, the number of laborers and laborers’ average age 
are important factors determining the off-farm labor supply. The number of laborers 
has positive effect on off-farm labor supply, and this is because labor surplus in farm 
production  is  a  main  motivation  for  off-farm  employment.  The  average  age  of 
laborers is negatively associated with off-farm work, because the younger labor is 
more likely to be involved in off-farm activities. The schooling of laborers has  a 
positive effect on off-farm employment, but the effect is not statistically significant. 
The fact that most of the rural laborers are not well educated and can only find the 
low-skilled manual job may be a reason. The results also indicate that other variables 
such as land size and asset value, are not important for off-farm employment. 
  5.2 Farm machinery investment equation 
We  estimate  the  farm  machinery  investment  model  following  the  method 
suggested  by  Rivers  and  Vuong  (1988)  and  Wooldridge  (2003,  pp.473-475).  The 
estimation results are reported in Table 4. A Wald test shows that off-farm work time 
is an endogenous variable, so that the IV approaches are appropriate.   
Here  we  focus  on  the  impact  of  off-farm  employment  on  the  possession  of 
machinery. The number of laborers has a significantly positive effect on machinery 15 
 
investment and the off-farm work has a significantly negative impact on machinery 
investment.  Our  findings  are  consistent  with  the  results  by  Zhao  (2002)  for  the 
relationship between migration and farm machinery investment, as well as with the 
results  by  Ahituv  et  al  (2002)  and  Liu  et  al  (2002)  for  the  relationship  between 
off-farm work and total farm investment.   
When we replace the dependent variable with the machinery service input in 
farm production we find opposite results. It indicates that the input substitute effect 
plays a major role, as farm labor and machinery service are negatively associated. 
Therefore,  the  negative  impact  of  off-farm  employment  on  farm  machinery 
investment is not due to the expansion effect as other researchers suggested. It is 
caused by the machinery service market. The agriculture household prefers the market 
machinery service to investing in the farm machinery when the labors are involved in 
off-farm activities. 
The sign of other variables are in line with the theoretical expectation. Land has 
a  positive  effect  on  farm  machinery  investment,  but  the  effect  is  not  statistically 
significant.  The  effect  of  machinery  service  market  price  is  positive  and  highly 
significant. This indicates that an agriculture household will be more likely to retain 
farm  machinery  when  the  service  price  is  high.  Wealth  level  has  a  positive  and 
statistically significant effect due to the effect of affordability. The share of young 
male laborers has a positive effect and the age of household head has a negative effect. 
These are because it needs strong muscles to operate a tractor and to handle the tractor 
towing machinery in rural China. Therefore when a household lacks this kind of labor 
forces, it will be more likely to purchase the market service.   
6. Conclusions and policy implications 
This  paper  examines  the  joint  decisions  of  China  rural  household  to  work 
off-farm and/or to invest farm machinery. The theoretical analysis shows that when 
the  market  service  is  available  the  relationship  between  off-farm  work  and  farm 
machinery  investment  are  more  complicated.  The  empirical  study  reveals  the 
interaction between them. At the household level, farm machinery (particularly small 16 
 
size machinery) and farm labor are gross complements. On the one hand retaining 
farm machinery is more likely to reduce off-farm labor supply, and on the other hand 
participation  in  off-farm  activities  reduces  the  possibility  of  investing  in  farm 
machinery. 
The results in this paper have strong implications for China’s farm machinery 
subsidy policy. As the farm machinery has negative effect on off-farm labor supply, if 
the  subsidy  policy  aims  at  the  small  own-use  machinery  it  may  encourage  more 
agriculture households to purchase small machinery and hence reduces off-farm labor 
supply. While if the subsidy policy aims at the large-size machinery it may reduce the 
market price of machinery service and encourage agricultural households to purchase 
more  market  services  instead  of  investing  in  small-size  machinery,  and  this  will 
eventually promote off-farm labor supply.   
After the reform, Chinese agriculture households once increased the demand for 
small own-use machinery. As off-farm employment opportunities now start to absorb 
a large number of young and male laborers, the agricultural laborers in China tends to 
be aging and feminine as in some advanced economies, such as Japan, the demand for 
market machinery services has began to increase. Reaction to the changing demand, 
the machinery policy should support large- and medium-size machinery which could 
lower the market price of machinery services. Such a policy could also increase the 
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Figure 1: The capacity of different types of tractors after 1978 (million kw) 
Source： China national statistical bureau, the large and medium-sized agricultural tractors does not 
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Table 1: The relationship between farm machinery, labor and off-farm work 





Number of households  453  191  262 
Laborers per household  2.88  2.65  3.04 
off-farm employment months 
per laborer 
5.44  5.49  5.41 






Table 2: Definition and descriptive statistics of variables in models   
Models   
Tobit(ofwt)=f(fm, land, labors, meanage, meanedu, assets, mmt, fmt, mlt, flt, mmw, fmw, mlw, 
flw) 
probit(fm)=f(fm, land, labors, ymls, msp, asset, headage, headedu) 
Variable    Definition    Mean   
Standard 
Deviation 
ofwt  Off-farm work time last year (month)  15.661    13.470   
fm  Maintaining farm machinery or not (1=yes, 0=no)  0.578    0.494   
land  Size of cultivated land（mu）  9.363    9.776   
labors 
Number of laborers, a laborer is the one I with    more than 
16 years old and takes a farm or off-farm job 
2.876    1.256   
meanage  Average age of labors (year)  43.896    11.084   
meanedu  Average schooling of labors (year)  6.037    3.025   
assets 
The value of machinery, house, enterprises, and other fix 
assets (thousand yuan) 
81.001    249.535   
mmt 
Off-farm employment time of male laborers for other 
households of the village (months) 
5.036    1.271   
fmt 
Off-farm  employment  time  of  female  laborers  forother 
households of the village (months) 
4.372    1.404   
mlt 
Local  off-farm  employment  time  of  male  labors  for  other 
households of the village (hours) 
79.585    32.806   
flt 
Local off-farm employment time of female labors for other 
households of the village (hours) 
47.131    38.691   
mmw 
Off-farm employment wage of male laborers for other 
households of the village (yuan/ month) 
1438.973    283.076   
fmw 
Off-farm  employment  wage  of  female  labors  for  other 
households of the village (yuan/ month) 
1075.368    138.190   
mlw 
Local off-farm employment wage of male laborers for other 
households of the village (yuan/ hour) 
7.338    5.089   
flw 
Local off-farm employment wage of female labors for other 
households of the village (yuan/hour) 
5.347    2.361   
ymls  Percentage of male laborers younger than age 60 (%)  45.164    24.366   
pm 
Market price of machinery service, represented by the rice/ 
wheat combine harvesting price (yuan/ mu) 
53.107    12.727   
headage  Age of household head (year)  51.617    11.547   
headedu  Schooling of household head (year)  5.525    4.075   





Table 3: Maximum likelihood estimates (Tobit) of off-farm work time equation 
  Coefficient    Standard error  z-value  p-value 
constant  3.2016    9.5815    0.33  0.7380 
fm  -12.9434
**    5.4896    -2.36  0.0180 
labors  8.2312
***    0.4091    20.12  0.0000 
meanage  -0.5050
***    0.0853    -5.92  0.0000 
meanedu  0.1705    0.1928    0.88  0.3770 
land  0.0559    0.0685    0.82  0.4140 
assets  0.0009
***    0.0020    4.65  0.0000 
mmt  0.9368    0.7615    1.23  0.2190 
fmt  -1.2084    0.8388    -1.44  0.1500 
mlt  0.0189    0.0302    0.63  0.5320 
flt  0.0227    0.0342    0.67  0.5060 
mmw  -0.0034    0.0034    -1.01  0.3140 
fmw  0.0130
***    0.0047    2.78  0.0060 
mlw  0.1847    0.1164    1.59  0.1120 
flw  0.3940    0.2715    1.45  0.1470 
/alpha  10.0877
*    5.6771    1.78  0.0760 
/lns  2.1447
***    0.0379    56.6  0.0000 
/lnv  -0.8909
***    0.0335    -26.61  0.0000 
s  8.5397    0.3236       
v  0.4103    0.0137       
Wald chi2(14) =708.25
***                             
Wald test of exogeneity: chi2(1) =3.16
*       









Table  4  Estimation  Results  for  machinery  investment  equation  and  machinery  service  input 
equation 
 
Probit model for machinery investment equation 
  OLS model for machinery 
service input equation 
Coefficient    Standard error  Coefficient    Standard error 
constant  -1.7712
***  0.4913  22.2599
***  4.6775 
ofwt  -0.1099
***  0.0158  0.1871
***  0.0676 
labors  1.0287
***  0.1184  -2.1103
***  0.7173 
ymls  0.8949
***  0.2697  0.1438  2.5550 
land  0.0101  0.0072  3.5695
***  0.0572 
pm  0.0161
***  0.0053  -0.4235
***  0.0429 
assets  0.0002
***  0.0001  0.0000  0.0000 
headage  -0.0186
***  0.0071  -0.0616  0.0563 
headedu  0.0250  0.0159  0.0750  0.1433 
/lnsigma  2.0328
***  0.0356     
/athrho  0.9500
***  0.3342     
sigma  7.6351  0.2717     
rho  0.7398  0.1513     
  Wald chi2(8) =267.74
***  R-squared= 0.9059 
 
F(8, 444) =    534.31
*** 
 
   
  Wald test of exogeneity: chi2(1) =8.08*
*  
   




***denote 10%，5%，and 1% significance levels respectively. 
 